Singing Sword [Operational Information]
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- Independent ORBAT
Enemy ORBAT
| Category | Strength | Availability |
|---|---|---|
|
Initial Assault Forces |
||
| 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade | 2,400 personnel | |
| - 877th Naval Infantry Battalion | ||
| - 878th Naval Infantry Battalion | ||
| - 879th Naval Infantry Battalion | ||
| - 145th Reconnaissance Company | ||
| East German 6th Frontier Brigade | 1,200 personnel | |
| - 134th Motorized Rifle Battalion | ||
| - 135th Motorized Rifle Battalion | ||
| - 136th Motorized Rifle Battalion | ||
| Polish 15th Amphibious Assault Regiment | 800 personnel | |
| - 1st Assault Battalion | ||
| - 2nd Assault Battalion | ||
|
First Reinforcement Echelon |
Estimated Available: July 5-7 |
|
| 138th Guards Motor-Rifle Division | 4,500 personnel | |
| - 423rd Guards Motor-Rifle Regiment | ||
| - 424th Guards Motor-Rifle Regiment | ||
| - 89th Guards Tank Regiment | ||
| 234th Guards Air Assault Regiment (76th Guards AAD) | 1,500 personnel | |
| - 1st Airborne Battalion | ||
| - 2nd Airborne Battalion | ||
| - 3rd Airborne Battalion | ||
|
Heavy Reinforcement Echelon |
12,000 personnel |
Estimated Available: July 10-15 |
| 10th Guards Tank Division | 10,000 personnel | |
| - 67th Guards Tank Regiment | ||
| - 68th Guards Tank Regiment | ||
| - 69th Guards Tank Regiment | ||
| - 425th Guards Motor-Rifle Regiment | ||
| 129th Guards Artillery Brigade | 1,200 personnel | |
| - 456th Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion | ||
| - 457th Multiple Rocket Launcher Battalion | ||
| 244th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment | 800 personnel | |
| - 1st SAM Battalion (SA-6) | ||
| - 2nd SAM Battalion (SA-8) | ||
| Total Peak Strength | 22,400 personnel |
Initial Garrison and Coastal Forces
The 336th Guards Independent Naval Infantry Brigade constitutes the primary Soviet assault force conducting amphibious operations against Hiiumaa Island and adjacent coastal sectors of Lääne County. Western intelligence assesses this unit deployed from Kaliningrad with full combat strength of approximately 2,400 personnel, organized into three naval infantry battalions with attached reconnaissance, engineer, and air defense companies. The brigade operates BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers and maintains organic 122mm artillery support through attached battery elements from Baltic Fleet coastal artillery units.
East German participation centers on the 6th Frontier Brigade (Grenzbrigade Küste), a specialized coastal defense formation transferred from Baltic Sea patrol duties to support Soviet suppression operations. This unit provides approximately 1,200 personnel organized into three motorized rifle battalions equipped with BTR-152 and BTR-50 amphibious vehicles suitable for Estonian coastal terrain. The East German contingent includes signals intelligence specialists and combat engineers experienced in coastal fortification reduction.
Polish People's Army contribution involves elements of the 7th Coastal Defense Division, specifically the 15th Amphibious Assault Regiment deployed from Gdynia naval facilities. Polish forces number approximately 800 personnel operating BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles and providing specialized naval gunfire coordination capabilities. Western intelligence indicates Polish involvement serves primarily political purposes, showing Warsaw Pact solidarity while limiting actual combat exposure for Polish units.
Soviet Reinforcement Echelons
Category A motor-rifle units from the Leningrad Military District provide the primary reinforcement capability as operations expand inland from initial beachhead positions. The 138th Guards Motor-Rifle Division, normally stationed near Vyborg, deployed two regiments totaling approximately 4,000 personnel with T-80 main battle tanks and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. Western intelligence assesses this formation capable of sustained offensive operations against organized resistance, with particular effectiveness in forested terrain characteristic of Estonian interior regions.
The 45th Independent Air Assault Regiment, drawn from VDV reserves, provides rapid deployment capability for seizing key terrain features and transportation nodes throughout Lääne County. This airborne unit operates with approximately 1,500 personnel equipped with BMD airborne fighting vehicles and organic 122mm artillery support. Intelligence reports indicate the regiment practiced helicopter assault operations specifically targeting Estonian infrastructure during June training exercises, suggesting pre-planned mission assignments for current operations.
Heavy Armor and Artillery Reinforcement
Second-echelon reinforcement involves deployment of the 10th Guards Tank Division from the Baltic Military District, bringing significant armored capability to support expansion operations beyond coastal sectors. This formation provides approximately 10,000 personnel with 328 main battle tanks including T-80 and T-72 variants, plus organic motor-rifle elements equipped with BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. Western intelligence assesses this unit capable of decisive offensive operations against any organized Estonian resistance or potential NATO intervention forces.
Artillery support expands significantly with deployment of the 129th Guards Artillery Brigade, providing 152mm self-propelled howitzers and multiple rocket launcher systems for fire support throughout operational area. Intelligence estimates indicate approximately 72 artillery pieces available for sustained fire missions, with particular emphasis on counter-battery capabilities against potential Western artillery support for Estonian resistance elements.
Air defense coverage increases through deployment of SA-6 Gainful and SA-8 Gecko surface-to-air missile systems from the 244th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment. Western analysts assess this provides comprehensive low-to-medium altitude air defense coverage throughout southern Estonia, significantly complicating potential NATO air operations in support of resistance activities or humanitarian missions.
Specialized and Support Elements
| Support Element | Strength | Availability | Primary Function |
|---|---|---|---|
| Combat Support | |||
| 25th Independent Engineer Regiment | 800 personnel | Estimated Available: July 5-7 | Bridge-laying, mine-clearing, fortification |
| - MTU-55 Bridge Company | |||
| - IMR-2 Combat Engineer Company | |||
| 47th Independent Chemical Defense Battalion | 200 personnel | Estimated Available: July 3-5 | Decontamination, chemical reconnaissance |
| • 16th Independent Radio-Electronic Combat Regiment | 600 personnel | Estimated Available: July 1-3 | SIGINT, communications jamming |
| Aviation Support | |||
| 398th Independent Helicopter Regiment | 400 personnel | Estimated Available: July 1-3 | Tactical air support, transport |
| - Mi-8 Hip Transport Squadron (12 aircraft) | |||
| - Mi-24 Hind Attack Squadron (12 aircraft) | |||
| • 12th Independent Military Transport Aviation Regiment | 300 personnel | Estimated Available: July 7-10 | Strategic airlift, resupply |
| - An-12 Cub Transport Squadron (8 aircraft) | |||
| - An-26 Curl Transport Squadron (8 aircraft) | |||
| Logistics Support | |||
| • 145th Independent Material-Technical Support Battalion | 500 personnel | Estimated Available: July 1-3 | Ammunition, fuel, maintenance |
| • 67th Independent Medical Battalion | 300 personnel | Estimated Available: July 3-5 | Field hospitals, casualty evacuation |
| Total Support Strength | 3,100 personnel |
Engineer support involves the 25th Independent Engineer Regiment providing bridge-laying, mine-clearing, and fortification construction capabilities essential for sustained operations in Estonian terrain. This unit operates specialized equipment including MTU-55 bridge layers and IMR-2 combat engineer vehicles.
Chemical defense capabilities center on the 47th Independent Chemical Defense Battalion, equipped with decontamination vehicles and specialized reconnaissance assets. Western intelligence indicates this unit's deployment may reflect Soviet concerns about potential chemical or tactical nuclear weapons employment.
Signal intelligence and electronic warfare support comes from elements of the 16th Independent Radio-Electronic Combat Regiment, providing communications intercept and jamming capabilities against Estonian resistance networks and potential NATO coordination elements. Intelligence assessments indicate this unit possesses sophisticated equipment for monitoring and disrupting civilian communications throughout the operational area.
Logistics and Sustainment
Military transport aviation support involves elements of the 12th Independent Military Transport Aviation Regiment operating An-12 Cub and An-26 Curl aircraft for personnel and equipment movement between Soviet territory and forward bases in occupied Estonian territory. Western intelligence estimates indicate approximately 16 transport aircraft available for sustained airlift operations, with additional civilian Aeroflot resources requisitioned for logistical support missions. Heavier lift aircraft, such as the IL-76, have historically been utilized as well.
Medical support involves the 67th Independent Medical Battalion providing battlefield medical treatment and evacuation capabilities throughout the operational area. Intelligence reports indicate establishment of field hospitals near Haapsalu and provisional medical facilities on Hiiumaa Island, suggesting Soviet planning for sustained operations with significant casualty expectations.
Assessment and Capabilities
Total Warsaw Pact strength in southern Estonia operations reaches approximately 22,000 personnel across all participating units, with Soviet forces comprising roughly 85% of total strength. Western intelligence assesses this force structure capable of overwhelming Estonian resistance elements and conducting sustained operations against limited NATO intervention capabilities.
Command and control operates through the Baltic Military District headquarters with forward command posts established near Paldiski and Haapsalu. Intelligence indicates direct coordination with KGB border troops and internal security forces for population control and counter-intelligence operations in occupied areas.
Friendly ORBAT
| Category | Strength | Availability |
|---|---|---|
|
Immediate Response Forces |
6,200 personnel | |
| 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (1st MAR DIV) | 900 personnel | |
| - Echo Company | ||
| - Fox Company (You!) | ||
| - Golf Company | ||
|
- Weapons Company |
||
| 42 Commando Royal Marines [outside our AOR] | 650 personnel | |
| - X Company | ||
| - Y Company | ||
| - Z Company | ||
| West German Panzer Brigade 2 | 4,200 personnel | |
| - Panzer Battalion 23 | ||
| - Panzer Battalion 24 | ||
| - Panzergrenadier Battalion 22 | ||
| - Artillery Battalion 2 | ||
| • Danish Jutland Division (Elements) | 450 personnel | |
| - 1st Reconnaissance Battalion | ||
|
First Reinforcement Wave |
8,800 personnel |
Estimated Available: July 6-8 |
| 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines (2nd MAR DIV)[outside our AOR] | 900 personnel | |
| - India Company | ||
| - Kilo Company | ||
| - Lima Company | ||
| - Weapons Company | ||
| British 3rd Commando Brigade (Elements)[outside our AOR] | 2,400 personnel | |
| - 40 Commando Royal Marines | ||
| - 45 Commando Royal Marines | ||
| - 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery | ||
| US 82nd Airborne Division (Elements) | 3,200 personnel | |
| - 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment | ||
| - 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment | ||
| - 1st Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment | ||
| West German 1st Airborne Brigade [outside our AOR] | 2,300 personnel | |
| - Fallschirmjäger Battalion 251 | ||
| - Fallschirmjäger Battalion 261 | ||
| - Fallschirmjäger Battalion 271 | ||
|
Heavy Reinforcement Wave |
12,500 personnel |
Estimated Available: July 10-14 |
| British 1st Armoured Division (Elements) [outside our AOR] | 6,000 personnel | |
| - 7th Armoured Brigade | ||
| - 4th Armoured Brigade | ||
| US 3rd Armored Division (Elements) | 4,500 personnel | |
| - 3rd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division | ||
| - 2nd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division | ||
| West German 6th Panzergrenadier Division (Elements) [outside our AOR] | 2,000 personnel | |
| - Panzergrenadier Brigade 17 | ||
| Total Peak Strength | 27,500 personnel | Estimated Available: July 18+ |
Naval Aviation and Support Aircraft
| Aviation Element | Aircraft Strength | Availability | Primary Mission |
|---|---|---|---|
| USS Nimitz Carrier Air Wing | 86 aircraft | Estimated Available: July 1-3 | Air superiority, strike operations |
| • VF-41 Black Aces (F-14A Tomcat) | 12 aircraft | Fleet air defense, CAP | |
| • VF-84 Jolly Rogers (F-14A Tomcat) | 12 aircraft | Fleet air defense, CAP | |
| • VFA-82 Marauders (F/A-18A Hornet) | 12 aircraft | Multi-role fighter/attack | |
| • VFA-86 Sidewinders (F/A-18A Hornet) | 12 aircraft | Multi-role fighter/attack | |
| • VA-34 Blue Blasters (A-6E Intruder) | 10 aircraft | All-weather attack | |
| • VA-176 Thunderbolts (A-6E Intruder) | 4 aircraft | Tanker, electronic warfare | |
| • VAW-124 Bear Aces (E-2C Hawkeye) | 4 aircraft | Airborne early warning | |
| • VS-32 Maulers (S-3A Viking) | 10 aircraft | ASW, surface surveillance | |
| • HS-7 Dusty Dogs (SH-3H Sea King) | 6 aircraft | ASW, SAR, logistics | |
| • VQ-2 Batmen (EA-6B Prowler) | 4 aircraft | Electronic warfare | |
| HMS Invincible Task Group | 24 aircraft | Estimated Available: July 3-5 | ASW, air defense |
| • 801 Naval Air Squadron (Sea Harrier FRS.1) | 8 aircraft | Fleet air defense, CAP | |
| • 820 Naval Air Squadron (Sea King HAS.5) | 9 aircraft | ASW operations | |
| • 826 Naval Air Squadron (Sea King HAS.5) | 7 aircraft | ASW operations | |
| Land-Based Air Support | 96 aircraft | Estimated Available: July 2-6 | Close air support, interdiction |
| • RAF No. 1 Squadron (Harrier GR.5) | 12 aircraft | Close air support | |
| • RAF No. 4 Squadron (Harrier GR.5) | 12 aircraft | Close air support | |
| • USAFE 81st TFW (A-10A Thunderbolt II) | 24 aircraft | Close air support, anti-armor | |
| • USAFE 52nd TFW (F-16C Fighting Falcon) | 24 aircraft | Air superiority, SEAD | |
| • West German JG 71 (F-4F Phantom II) | 24 aircraft | Air defense, ground attack | |
| Total Aviation Strength | 206 aircraft |
Amphibious and Maritime Support
The USS Saipan Amphibious Ready Group provides primary sea-based logistics and fire support capabilities for Marine Corps operations in the Baltic region. Intelligence assessments indicate this formation includes approximately 2,400 naval personnel operating LPH-2 Saipan, LPD-4 Austin, and LSD-36 Anchorage with embarked Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron HMM-264 providing CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea Stallion rotary-wing transport capabilities. The amphibious group maintains organic landing craft air cushion vehicles and conventional landing craft for sustained shore-to-ship logistics operations supporting extended Marine Corps deployments in Estonian coastal areas.
Air Defense and Electronic Warfare
Integrated air defense operations rely primarily on naval-based systems supplemented by rapidly deployable ground-based assets brought forward by Marine Corps and British Royal Marines units. USS Nimitz carrier battle group provides comprehensive area air defense through AN/SPY-1 Aegis radar systems and Standard SM-2 surface-to-air missiles capable of engaging multiple aerial threats simultaneously across extended ranges. Intelligence assessments indicate carrier-based E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft provide surveillance coverage extending approximately 200 nautical miles from launch platforms, enabling detection and tracking of Warsaw Pact aviation activities throughout the Baltic region.
British contribution to air defense includes deployment of Rapier surface-to-air missile systems organic to Royal Marines commando units, providing point defense capabilities for critical logistics nodes and command facilities established in occupied Estonian territory. RAF Regiment elements deploy lightweight air defense systems including Blowpipe man-portable air defense missiles and 35mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns providing coverage for forward airfield operations and helicopter landing zones throughout the operational area.
Electronic warfare capabilities center on EA-6B Prowler aircraft embarked aboard USS Nimitz providing communications jamming and radar suppression missions against Warsaw Pact command and control networks. US Marine Corps deploys tactical electronic warfare assets including AN/TLQ-17A jammers and signals intelligence collection equipment operated by specialized communication reconnaissance personnel. British electronic warfare support includes deployment of RAF elements operating specialized equipment for monitoring and disrupting Warsaw Pact communications throughout Estonian territory during ongoing suppression operations.
Logistics and Medical Support
Sustainment operations for NATO forces in Baltic operations depend heavily on sea-based logistics coordinated through allied naval cooperation and established supply lines from West German and British ports. US Navy Military Sealift Command provides strategic sealift capabilities through deployment of fast sealift ships USNS Algol and USNS Bellatrix capable of transporting heavy equipment and bulk supplies directly to forward operating areas established in Danish and West German coastal facilities. Intelligence assessments indicate NATO logistics planning anticipates requirement for sustained operations lasting 30-45 days with organic supply capabilities before requiring major resupply operations from Continental European sources.
Medical support capabilities include deployment of US Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort providing comprehensive surgical and critical care facilities for casualties from all NATO allied forces participating in Baltic operations. British medical support includes establishment of field hospitals operated by Royal Army Medical Corps personnel with specialized trauma surgery capabilities developed through recent experience in conflict zones. German medical support provides evacuation and treatment capabilities through deployment of specialized medical helicopters and mobile surgical units positioned at forward operating bases established near operational areas.
West German logistics support includes deployment of territorial army units providing fuel distribution, ammunition handling, and maintenance capabilities for allied armored and mechanized units operating in extended deployment conditions. Intelligence reports indicate German logistics planning includes pre-positioned supplies and maintenance facilities capable of supporting sustained combat operations by mixed NATO forces without requiring immediate resupply from rear-area facilities located in West Germany or other allied territory.
Intelligence and Reconnaissance
Intelligence operations coordinate through established NATO intelligence-sharing mechanisms with emphasis on real-time tactical intelligence supporting ongoing combat operations against Warsaw Pact forces in Estonian territory. US intelligence capabilities include deployment of specialized reconnaissance assets including U-2 high-altitude surveillance aircraft operating from West European bases and RC-135 electronic reconnaissance aircraft providing signals intelligence collection throughout the Baltic region. CIA paramilitary personnel coordinate with Estonian resistance networks established during previous phases of Soviet suppression operations, providing real-time intelligence on Warsaw Pact force movements and logistics activities.
British intelligence support includes deployment of Special Air Service reconnaissance teams providing deep reconnaissance and target acquisition capabilities throughout occupied Estonian territory. Intelligence assessments indicate SAS personnel maintain coordination with Estonian resistance elements and provide targeting information for precision strike operations conducted by allied aviation assets. Signals intelligence capabilities include deployment of RAF reconnaissance aircraft and specialized ground-based collection assets providing comprehensive monitoring of Warsaw Pact communications and electronic emissions throughout the operational area.
West German intelligence contributions include deployment of specialized border reconnaissance units with extensive experience in monitoring Warsaw Pact military activities and comprehensive knowledge of Soviet and East German tactical procedures and equipment capabilities. German intelligence assets provide valuable assessment of enemy force capabilities and likely tactical responses to NATO operations based on years of observation and analysis of Warsaw Pact training exercises and deployment patterns throughout Central Europe.
Assessment and Capabilities
Total NATO strength committed to Baltic operations reaches approximately 27,500 personnel supported by 206 combat and support aircraft across all participating allied nations. Intelligence assessments indicate this force structure provides sufficient capability for sustained defensive operations and limited offensive capabilities against Warsaw Pact forces deployed in Estonian territory, though extended operations would require additional reinforcement from strategic reserves located throughout NATO member nations. The combination of amphibious assault capabilities, rapid deployment forces, and comprehensive air and naval support provides NATO with flexible response options ranging from humanitarian evacuation missions to sustained combat operations against organized Warsaw Pact resistance.
Command and control operates through BALTAP headquarters with coordination centers established aboard USS Nimitz and at forward operating bases in West Germany and Denmark. Intelligence indicates NATO force integration benefits from extensive joint training exercises and established communication procedures, though coordination challenges remain significant given the multinational composition and varying national rules of engagement governing combat operations in Baltic waters and Estonian territory.
Latest Intelligence and Map
We are in Estonia. Seriously. It should not be that fucking difficult for you morons to have a modicum of a grasp on where we are and what we are doing. I will put you inside of the bad boy chamber if you pull my leg or ask me retarded shit this month like "durr do we take prisoners" yes. "errmm, are we shooting civilians" no. "hurr who are we fighting" the warsaw pact. "uh isn't the map in finnish but we are fighting in estonia?" ei vittu ole mitään vitun mahdollisuutta että tietäisit sen ihan tyhjästä. 
Click here for interactive map.
Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
Date-Time Group: 0600Z 03 JUL 89
1. SITUATION
Enemy Forces
Intelligence indicates NAI Jacobs contains East German patrol elements from DDR-134 MSB (6th Frontier Brigade). Enemy strength estimated at reinforced squad to platoon level conducting reconnaissance and early warning missions. East German forces equipped with APCs and standard Warsaw Pact small arms. Enemy likely positioned in prepared defensive positions with improved fighting positions and potential minefields along primary avenues of approach.
Enemy mining capabilities include conventional anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, with assessed capability for improvised explosive devices utilizing shaped charges positioned in treelines along MSR Biddle. East German forces maintain tactical communications equipment and possess operational intelligence materials including unit codebooks (identified as pink-covered documents with red identification stripes) and tactical maps showing defensive preparations.
Friendly Forces
Echo Company, 2/5 Marines will follow Fox Company (You!) ashore with mission to reinforce forward positions and expand operational area. Naval gunfire support available from USS Iowa battle group. Close air support available from USS Nimitz air wing upon request.
Terrain and Weather
Operational area consists of mixed coastal terrain with sandy beaches transitioning to wooded areas inland. OBJ Bedham airfield provides hard-surface runway suitable for follow-on air operations. NAI Biddle road network consists of paved surfaces connecting airfield complex to natural harbor facilities capable of accommodating LST and LCU operations. Kelviikinohoja Spit presents narrow coastal approach with limited maneuver space. Weather conditions favorable with light winds and good visibility.
2. MISSION
Fox Company, 2/5 Marines conducts amphibious assault to seize Beach Immelmann, locate and destroy enemy forces in NAI Jacobs, seize OBJ Bedham airfield intact, clear MSR Biddle (and find out if it is mined), establish blocking position at BP Baylies, and clear enemy positions from NAI Berthold (Kelviikinohoja Spit) to establish secure operational area for follow-on forces.
3. EXECUTION
Concept of Operations
Fox Company conducts ship-to-shore movement via landing craft to Beach Immelmann. Upon securing beachhead, company advances inland to locate East German staging areas in NAI Jacobs with priority intelligence requirements focusing on seizure of enemy codebooks and operational documents. Company then conducts deliberate attack to seize OBJ Bedham airfield with emphasis on preventing damage to runway facilities and capturing enemy maps showing naval mine locations. Following airfield seizure, company clears MSR Biddle route for LST approach while conducting detailed reconnaissance for enemy mining efforts. Company subsequently divides into two elements: one establishing defensive positions at BP Baylies pending Echo Company arrival, while second element conducts clearing operations along Kelviikinohoja Spit.
Phase Line Alpha: Beach Immelmann secured, company consolidated for inland advance
Phase Line Bravo: NAI Jacobs cleared, intelligence materials secured
Phase Line Charlie: OBJ Bedham seized and secured
Phase Line Delta: MSR Biddle cleared, company divided for final objectives
Priority Intelligence Requirements:
- Enemy codebooks (pink covers, red stripes) - CRITICAL
- Naval mine location maps - CRITICAL
- Enemy force disposition and strength in operational area [EPWs]
- Civilian population status and locations
Rules of Engagement: Positive identification required before engagement. Minimize civilian casualties. Treat all civilians as non-combatants unless displaying hostile intent. Report all civilian encounters to command.
Radio Call Signs:
- Battalion: Felon
- Fox Company: Fox 6
- Echo Company: Echo 6
- Close Air Support: Outlaw
- PzPiKp 20 (Engineers): Lion 6
Recognition Signals
Running Password: FUCKTHE/POLICE
Vehicle Recognition: German engineering elements paint a wear a white triangle on vehicles, with a yellow D2 taped on the rear. If you encounter mines, call them, don't shoot them
COMMANDER'S INTENT: Fox Company will rapidly secure the operational area and deny enemy use of critical infrastructure while gathering intelligence on enemy defensive preparations. Speed and violence of action are essential to prevent enemy reinforcement and maintain operational surprise.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Treat this as peer-level combat operations. Enemy forces are trained, equipped, and motivated. Maintain proper spacing, utilize cover and concealment, and follow proper tactical procedures. Don't burn your ammo on soft skin vehicles or trucks.
Friendly AI forces will be operating in the area - maintain positive identification procedures for all contacts.
END OF MESSAGE
Out of Date Intelligence
How the fuck do I read the map?
Soviet military abbreviation practices employed standardized Cyrillic designations that Western intelligence services transliterated into Latin characters for operational mapping and order of battle tracking. The abbreviation system distinguished between basic unit types, specialized functions, and command relationships within the Warsaw Pact force structure.
The Guards designation (гвардейская/GV) indicated elite status units with enhanced training, equipment, and personnel standards compared to standard formations. Independent or separate units (отдельный/OTD) operated outside normal divisional structure and typically possessed specialized capabilities or direct higher-command control. These modifiers preceded the basic unit type abbreviation in standard Soviet military documentation.
Western intelligence agencies maintained Soviet abbreviation conventions in classified mapping products to ensure precise unit identification and avoid confusion during crisis situations. The transliterated system enabled rapid recognition of unit capabilities, command relationships, and organizational structure without requiring extensive translation or interpretation of captured enemy documents or intercepted communications.
"This seems grossly unclear" well, lock in. We still do it.
Standard Unit Type Abbreviations
| Unit Type | Soviet Abbreviation | Map Designation | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Infantry Units | |||
| Naval Infantry Battalion | мп бат (mp bat) | MP BAT | 877 MP BAT |
| Naval Infantry Brigade | мп бр (mp br) | MP BR | 336 GV MP BR |
| Motor-Rifle Battalion | мсб (msb) | MSB | 134 MSB |
| Motor-Rifle Regiment | мсп (msp) | MSP | 423 GV MSP |
| Motor-Rifle Division | мсд (msd) | MSD | 138 GV MSD |
| Air Assault Battalion | дшб (dshb) | DSHB | 1 DSHB |
| Air Assault Regiment | дшп (dshr) | DSHR | 234 GV DSHR |
| Air Assault Division | вдд (vdd) | VDD | 76 GV VDD |
| Reconnaissance Company | разв рота (razv rota) | RAZV ROTA | 145 RAZV ROTA |
| Reconnaissance Battalion | разв бат (razv bat) | RAZV BAT | 12 RAZV BAT |
| Armored Units | |||
| Tank Battalion | тб (tb) | TB | 1 TB |
| Tank Regiment | тп (tp) | TP | 67 GV TP |
| Tank Division | тд (td) | TD | 10 GV TD |
| Artillery Units | |||
| Artillery Battalion | аб (ab) | AB | 456 AB |
| Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion | саб (sab) | SAB | 456 SAB |
| Artillery Brigade | абр (abr) | ABR | 129 GV ABR |
| Artillery Regiment | ап (ap) | AP | 89 GV AP |
| Multiple Rocket Launcher Battalion | рсзо бат (rszo bat) | RSZO BAT | 457 RSZO BAT |
| Air Defense Units | |||
| Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment | зрп (zrp) | ZRP | 244 ZRP |
| SAM Battalion | зрдн (zrdn) | ZRDN | 1 ZRDN |
| Support Units | |||
| Engineer Regiment | ип (ip) | IP | 25 IP |
| Engineer Battalion | иб (ib) | IB | 12 IB |
| Chemical Defense Battalion | рхбз бат (rkhbz bat) | RKHBZ BAT | 47 RKHBZ BAT |
| Medical Battalion | мед бат (med bat) | MED BAT | 67 MED BAT |
| Supply Battalion | мто бат (mto bat) | MTO BAT | 145 MTO BAT |
| Signal Battalion | связь бат (svyaz bat) | SVYAZ BAT | 23 SVYAZ BAT |
| Aviation Units | |||
| Helicopter Regiment | вп (vp) | VP | 398 VP |
| Transport Aviation Regiment | втап (vtap) | VTAP | 12 VTAP |
| East German Units | |||
| Frontier Brigade | гр бр (gr br) | GR BR | DDR-6 GR BR |
| Motorized Rifle Battalion (NVA) | мсб (msb) | MSB | DDR-134 MSB |
| Polish Units | |||
| Amphibious Assault Regiment | дес п (des p) | DES P | POL-15 DES P |
| Assault Battalion | дес бат (des bat) | DES BAT | POL-1 DES BAT |
Designation Modifiers
| Modifier | Soviet Term | Abbreviation | Usage |
|---|---|---|---|
| Guards | гвардейская (gvardeyskaya) | GV | 336 GV MP BR |
| Independent/Separate | отдельный (otdelnyy) | OTD | 25 OTD IP |
| Motorized | мотострелковый (motostrelkovyy) | MS | 134 MS BAT |
| Self-Propelled | самоходный (samokhodnyy) | SA | 456 SA AB |
Nationality Prefixes
| Nation | Prefix | Example Usage |
|---|---|---|
| Soviet | No prefix | 336 GV MP BR |
| East German | DDR- | DDR-134 MSB |
| Polish | POL- | POL-1 ASS BAT |
Independent ORBAT
Estonian Resistance Factions refers to the three primary partisan organizations conducting organized military and political opposition to Soviet control in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic following the February Crisis of 1989 and subsequent Operation Normalizovat suppression campaigns. Western intelligence agencies maintain operational contact with all three factions through various intermediary networks, providing material support and coordination for resistance activities against Warsaw Pact forces deployed in Baltic operations.
Background
The collapse of the Estonian Popular Front during Soviet suppression operations in February 1989 created a strategic vacuum that was filled by three distinct resistance organizations reflecting different ideological approaches to Estonian independence. These factions emerged from surviving elements of the original independence movement, military defectors from Soviet forces, and underground labor networks that had maintained operational capability despite extensive KGB surveillance and arrests. Western intelligence assessments indicate that factional divisions reflect broader Estonian society's political spectrum, though all three organizations maintain unified opposition to continued Soviet occupation.
The establishment of formal resistance networks accelerated following the deployment of the 336th Guards Independent Naval Infantry Brigade to Estonian territory in March 1989. Soviet military presence provided both the immediate threat that unified resistance activities and the tactical targets necessary for effective guerrilla operations. Intelligence reports indicate that initial resistance activities focused on intelligence gathering and safe house establishment, with armed operations beginning in April 1989 following the acquisition of external support through Swedish and Finnish intermediaries.
Organizational Structure
Metsavennad-89
Metsavennad-89 represents the continuation of Estonian ethnic nationalist resistance traditions dating to the original Forest Brothers operations of the 1940s and 1950s. The organization operates under the command of Colonel Jaan Kirsipuu, a former Estonian Territorial Defense Forces officer who served in Soviet operations in Afghanistan from 1984 to 1987. Western intelligence estimates indicate the faction maintains approximately 340 active fighters distributed across rural strongholds in Lahemaa National Park and the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa.
The organization's political ideology emphasizes ethnic Estonian nationalism with exclusionary policies toward Russian-speaking populations. Leadership advocates for the restoration of pre-1940 Estonian independence with citizenship restrictions based on ethnic and linguistic criteria. Operational doctrine reflects classical guerrilla warfare principles adapted from both historical Estonian resistance experience and Soviet special operations training acquired during Afghan service. The faction maintains the most aggressive stance toward direct military confrontation with Soviet forces and has conducted the highest number of confirmed attacks against Warsaw Pact personnel and installations.
Metsavennad-89 funding sources include Swedish-Estonian exile community donations and confirmed Central Intelligence Agency support channeled through Stockholm Station operations. Intelligence reports indicate monthly financial support of approximately fifty thousand dollars, supplemented by weapons deliveries via Swedish Maritime approaches. The organization's rural base areas provide extensive civilian support networks among farming and forestry communities, though recruitment remains limited to ethnic Estonian populations. Weapons caches established during initial formation include small arms retained from Afghan military service, supplemented by external deliveries of specialized equipment including night vision devices, encrypted communications gear, and plastic explosives.
Eesti Vabadus Organisatsioon
Eesti Vabadus Organisatsioon functions as the primary moderate democratic resistance network, drawing leadership from surviving elements of the Estonian Popular Front intellectual movement. The organization operates under dual leadership comprising Dr. Marju Lauristin, a former Popular Front deputy who evaded arrest during February suppression operations, and Captain Lembit Annus, a former Soviet Baltic Fleet submarine officer who defected following the Paldiski incident. Western intelligence assesses current active membership at approximately 200 operatives concentrated in urban areas including Tallinn, Tartu, and coastal communities with access to maritime approaches.
The faction's political program emphasizes liberal democratic governance, human rights protections, and integration with Western European institutions following independence. Leadership maintains explicit commitment to multi-ethnic Estonian society with guaranteed minority rights for Russian-speaking populations. Operational priorities focus on intelligence gathering, documentation of Soviet military activities, and maintenance of international communication channels rather than direct military confrontation. The organization serves as the primary conduit for Western intelligence agencies seeking information on Soviet Baltic Fleet operations, particularly regarding submarine activities at Paldiski naval facility.
Central Intelligence Agency support for Eesti Vabadus Organisatsioon represents the most extensive Western commitment to Estonian resistance activities, with confirmed monthly funding of one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars channeled through Helsinki Station via Finnish business intermediaries. Dr. Lauristin's recruitment occurred during academic exchanges in Stockholm during 1987, providing established contact protocols that enabled rapid operational activation following the February Crisis. The organization's intelligence value derives particularly from Captain Annus's detailed knowledge of Soviet naval installations and access to defector networks within Estonian military personnel. Supplied equipment includes sophisticated communications systems, document forgery materials, medical supplies, and emergency extraction protocols for high-value operatives.
Balti Tööliste Liit
Balti Tööliste Liit emerged from underground trade union networks that maintained organizational coherence despite both Gorbachev-era reforms and subsequent February Committee suppression measures. The faction operates under joint leadership of Marina Kaljurand, an Estonian-Russian shipyard organizer who coordinated strike activities during 1988, and Dmitri Volkov, a Russian democratic activist with connections to opposition movements within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Western intelligence estimates indicate active membership of approximately 180 organizers distributed across industrial centers in Tallinn, Narva, and the Kohtla-Järve mining region.
The organization's political ideology combines democratic socialist principles with anti-Stalinist opposition to Soviet centralized control. Leadership advocates for Estonian independence through worker self-management systems and maintains explicit multi-ethnic composition reflecting Estonia's industrial demographic patterns. Operational capabilities focus on industrial sabotage, work slowdowns, and coordination with Polish Solidarity underground networks rather than direct military confrontation. The faction's strategic value derives from access to critical infrastructure including ports, shipyards, mining operations, and transportation networks essential for Soviet military logistics in the Baltic region.
Central Intelligence Agency engagement with Balti Tööliste Liit represents the most politically sensitive aspect of Western support for Estonian resistance operations. Initial contact occurred through AFL-CIO international networks and Polish Solidarity intermediaries who provided operational security guarantees. Monthly funding of seventy-five thousand dollars reflects Agency ambivalence regarding support for socialist organizations, though operational justification emphasizes anti-Soviet rather than pro-capitalist objectives. Supplied equipment includes industrial explosives, secure communications for coordination with Polish networks, and financial support for families of imprisoned organizers. The faction's industrial sabotage capabilities have proven particularly effective in disrupting Soviet military supply lines and equipment maintenance operations.
Inter-Factional Relations
Coordination between Estonian resistance factions remains limited by fundamental ideological disagreements regarding post-independence political arrangements and ethnic minority policies. Metsavennad-89 leadership maintains absolute refusal to cooperate with Balti Tööliste Liit due to the latter's Russian membership and socialist ideology. Eesti Vabadus Organisatsioon serves as reluctant intermediary for tactical coordination while facing pressure from both nationalist and socialist factions to adopt more exclusive positions.
Western intelligence agencies maintain separate operational relationships with each faction to preserve maximum flexibility while avoiding direct involvement in factional disputes. Central Intelligence Agency analysis indicates that post-liberation coalition government formation would face significant challenges given current ideological divisions. Agency planning protocols focus on preventing inter-factional violence while maintaining unified anti-Soviet operational front during current resistance phase.
Weapons distribution and training coordination occur through Swedish military facilities in northern Sweden, ostensibly conducted as Swedish Armed Forces exercises but actually providing instruction in demolitions, communications, and guerrilla tactics for selected operatives from all three factions. Maritime weapons deliveries utilize Swedish fishing vessels operating in Estonian coastal waters, with cached equipment distributed according to operational requirements rather than factional preferences.
Operational Assessment
Total resistance strength of approximately 720 active operatives supported by extensive civilian networks creates significant operational challenges for Soviet occupation forces while remaining insufficient for independent liberation operations. Western intelligence planning assumes continued external support requirements for sustained resistance effectiveness, with particular emphasis on communications equipment, explosives, and medical supplies.